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Abstract
Ever since its existence, democracy is periodically diagnosed to be in crisis. When such crises are
analyzed, reference has usually been made to the malfunctioning of core democratic institutions
and the behavior of actors. We believe that this fails to capture a crucial element of the current
crisis. It is words, not (only) deeds that present the contemporary challenge to liberal democracy
even before such challenges materialize in institutional change. There are strong theoretical and
empirical reasons to take into account the public discourse of leading political figures when study-
ing democratic decline. In this article, we conceptualize illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric
as language practices that harm democracy. Such a practice-orientated approach allows for fine-
graded assessments of autocratizing tendencies in democracies that goes beyond an exclusive
focus on democratic institutions. By using a corpus of 4 506 speeches of 25 heads of government
from 22 countries and data on government disinformation and party identity, we empirically illus-
trate with dictionary analysis and logistic regression that illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric
are tightly linked to autocratization and should no longer be ignored.
1 Introduction
“Language changes always manifest social changes – but language changes (or changes
in language behaviour) can also trigger social changes” (Wodak, 1989, p. XV).
In this article, we argue that the public discourse1 of core political leaders should be taken into
account when analyzing the state of democracy. Through their signalling via speeches, political
leaders can either support or undermine the political structures in place. Empirically and logically,
the norm is that the values incorporated in political institutions and public speeches coincide
and thus reinforce each other (Linz, 1978; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Dawson, 2018). In liberal
democracies, leaders tend to choose a language that is in line with the normative commitment
this form of government entails (Maerz and Schneider, 2019). Likewise, in autocracies of various
forms, leaders in their speeches usually reflect and embody the essence of what their regime stands
for and is based on (Maerz, 2019).
We are interested in deviations from this norm. We aim at detecting instances in which the
public rhetoric of central political leaders is out of sync with the formal-institutional norm system
of a political regime because they provide clues for likely changes to the nature of that regime. We
hold that such periods of incongruence cannot last forever. One option is that institutions prevail
and the political leader is removed or at least changes the tone - through elections in democracies
and by other, often violent means, in non-democracies. Another scenario is that the political leader
succeeds in bringing the institutional system in line with the values expressed in his or her public
speeches.
By bringing public discourse (back) into the study of political regimes and with a particular
focus on democracies in crisis, we investigate into the question of how illiberal and authoritarian
public rhetoric relate to autocratization.2 We conceptualize illiberal public rhetoric as a practice
of infringing on autonomy and dignity by exceedingly emphasizing nationalist, paternalist, and
traditionalist values in official speeches or statements. Authoritarian public rhetoric is the prac-
tice of sabotaging accountability and disabling voice by officially promoting disinformation or
anti-pluralism (Glasius, 2018). One advantage of this two-fold framework is that it captures not
only those autocratiziers who harm democracy with misanthropic speeches - Hungary’s current
prime minister Viktor Orbán and his anti-immigration discourse being a prime example -, but
also accounts for the ruthless spread of disinformation, such as, for instance, former US president
Donald Trump.
We believe that our focus on public rhetoric is timely chosen. Few observers contest that the
calamitous events on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, demonstrate the effect of public speeches of
leading politicians on shifting behavioral norms. Surprisingly, though, theories on regime transi-
tions attribute little to no role on how political actors speak. Liberal democracy is deemed to be
1We define public discourse broadly as the entity of official communication put forward by a government and its
agents. We use public discourse, public communication, and public rhetoric interchangeably.
2Autocratization, the reverse concept of democratization, is an overarching term for any substantial decline of demo-
cratic regime attributes in democracies or autocracies (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019).
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in crisis - again (Maerz et al., 2020b; Kirsch and Welzel, 2018; Schmitter, 2015).3 And according
to some, symptoms of crisis are as old as liberal democracy and probably an inherent feature of
this form of political regime (O’Donnell, 2007a). What seems to distinguish the current crisis is
that it is driven from within and atop. In most instances, the driving forces of autocratization are
not primarily foreign actors, nor fringe opposition groups at the margin of society. Instead, liberal
democracy is questioned by actors in government. Another feature of the current crisis is that it
has been proceeding slowly and in small steps and it therefore has long been left undiagnosed and
untreated. Early symptoms of the malaise have been ignored or mis-interpreted. In this article,
we argue that listening to what rulers say can detect crises of democracy in the making. Public
rhetoric expresses declarations of intent. In the past, when democracy crises were diagnosed, ref-
erence has usually been made to the malfunctioning of core democratic institutions and the actual
behavior of different actors, who - purposefully or inadvertently - undermine democracy with their
(non-) action (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Merkel and Kneip, 2018, p. 23). This, so we argue, leaves
a blank spot in the democracy crisis literature: the use of public rhetoric as both a symptom and
a driver of the democratic malaise. Neglecting the positioning of leading politicians towards the
foundational principles and practices of democracy is particularly troublesome in analyzing the
current crisis. One of its distinct features is that in many cases democracy is verbally attacked
from its helm rather than by opposition parties or fringe groups.
Our claim that public speeches matter for the future of any political regime is, of course, far too
plausible to have gone unnoticed. It already features in the classic literature on democratic demise
(Linz, 1978) and is rediscovered in contemporary approaches (e.g Schedler, 2019). One reason for
why this analytic approach has, so far, not been employed more broadly in large-N comparative
regime analyses seems to be of practical nature: until recently, gathering and then analyzing huge
amounts of text has presented itself with prohibitively high costs. The development of text-as-data
approaches and computational solutions for harvesting unprecedented amounts of texts from the
web have dramatically reduced these costs (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013; Lucas et al., 2015; Maerz
and Puschmann, 2020). While these new tools cannot - and should not - replace human input
and interpretation, they can, however, radically augment a researcher’s capacity to analyze large
quantities of text, a property that we capitalize on with our approach.
We proceed as follows: In section 2 we present various strands of literature in which public
discourse takes center stage in analyzing social reality, in general, and political processes, in par-
ticular. In section 3, we outline how we conceptualize public rhetoric. The empirical illustrations
of our argument are discussed in section 4 before we conclude by providing an outlook on the role
of public rhetoric as a additional perspective in the political regime change literature.
3For a contrarian view, see Merkel (2014).
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2 Bringing public discourse (back) in the study of regime types and their change
Language matters. This commonsensical insight has made inroads into many different approaches
in the social sciences. Discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008), conversation analysis (Hutchby
and Wooffitt, 2008), sociolinguistic analysis (Wodak, 2009), discourse-historical approach (Wodak,
2001), (critical) discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Maynard, 2013), thematic analysis,
and content analysis (e.g. Mayring, 2010) are just some of the most prominent among those. Also
in the more positivistically inclined realm of the social sciences, the spoken word is becoming the
center of analytic attention, as the boom of text-as-data studies testifies (Grimmer and Stewart,
2013; Lucas et al., 2015). To this, one can add traditional fields like that of political communication
and media studies and it becomes clear that there is a widely shared understanding that not just
institutions and observable behavior matter for analyzing politics. We argue that the study of
political regimes and their evolution and change should not be an exception and, instead, start to
embrace public discourse in their analytic tool kit.
Critics of an increased focus on rhetoric might object that what is said matters less than what is
done, that actors might simply pay lip service, and that language largely remains without conse-
quences in the "real" world. To this Monroe and Schrodt (2008, p. 351) reply that "[t]ext is arguably
the most pervasive – and certainly the most persistent – artifact of political behavior." And "[...]
what political actors say, more than the behaviour they exhibit, provides evidence of their true
inner states" (Benoit, 2019, p. 1).
An analytic focus on actors is not new in the regime change literature. It was pushed into
the background with the shift from research on regime transitions to their consolidation and the
concomitant shift in focus away from actors to institutions and their behavior-regulating norms
(Schmitter and Guilhot, 2000). But even before the surge of third-wave democracy studies, in-
fluential writings on the breakdown of democracy stipulated that actors and their publicly ex-
pressed attitude towards democracy should play a prominent analytic role. In his seminal book,
Linz (1978) argues that, while it is normal in democracies that political competition usually entails
depicting the opponent as a representative of narrow or misguided interests, it is the "[...] style,
intensity, and fairness in conducting these actions [that] mark the distinction between loyal and
disloyal oppositions" (Linz, 1978, p.31).
Forces loyal to democracy are crucial for its survival, according to Linz. Distinguishing be-
tween loyal, semi-loyal, and disloyal is not easy and for this task Linz attributes high importance
to the public rhetoric of actors.4 For him, it suffices to rhetorically cross the boundaries of demo-
cratic norms to become semi- or disloyal and thus put in peril the survival of a democratic regime.
4Loyal forces are defined by, among other things: "1) An unambiguous public commitment to achievement of power
only by electoral means and a readiness to surrender it unconditionally to the other participants with the same com-
mitment. [...] 4) An unambiguous rejection of the rhetoric of violence to mobilize supporters in order to achieve power,
to retain it beyond the constitutional mandate, or to destroy opponents [...]. The defense of democracy must be carried
out [...] without arousing popular passion and political vigilantism." Further, "[...] a source of perception leading to
questions about the loyalty of the party to the system, is a willingness to encourage, tolerate, cover up, treat leniently,
excuse, or justify the actions of other participants that go beyond the limits of peaceful, legitimate patterns of politics
in a democracy" (Linz, 1978, p.32).
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Quite obviously, attentive observers of democracies currently deemed to be declining, such as
in Brazil, Poland, or the US,5 find numerous instances of public discourses by heads of government
in these countries that fit the bill of semi-loyal or even disloyal discourse that Linz spelled out
over 40 years ago. Despite its analytic relevance for studying regime change, public rhetoric is
still largely neglected by the current literature. Our argument is that this shortcoming should be
rectified. Only slowly do actors and their public discourse find their way back in as an analytic
category. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), in their influential book on how democracies die, follow
Linz in attributing importance to how politicians in democracies speak about core rules of the
democratic game. Their checklist for authoritarian behavior contains various entries that refer to
what political leaders say rather than to what they do (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018, p.23-24).
Schedler (2019) explicitly spells out the need to embrace the language dimension in order to
understand current processes in political regimes. He argues that there is a mismatch between
what predominant theories of regime change postulate as relevant factors, on the one hand, and
the widespread impressions of what is currently going wrong in democracies such as the US under
Trump, Bolsonaro’s Brazil, or Poland under Kaczynski, on the other.6 We concur with Schedler
in concluding that current developments in several democracies make us to acknowledge that
political actors, political language, and normative commitments are relevant factors for whether
or not democracies die. The democratic regime literature’s excessive focus on structures and in-
stitutions, though, has made the discipline overlook the long-acknowledged "[...] possibility that
deviant actors may disrupt structural equilibria always exists" (Schedler, 2019, p. 437).
All in all, with Schedler (2019, p. 452) we see the need for "bringing language back in" to the
analyses of political regimes and their transformations.7
3 Conceptualizing illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric
We theorize public rhetoric to be a part of the everyday practices that fill institutions with live, and
shape the character of a political regime (Glasius, 2018). Illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric
are two different but conceptually and empirically strongly overlapping and mutually not exclu-
sive categories, as depicted in the Venn diagram in Figure 3.
The illiberal category comprises all practices that infringe on autonomy and dignity (Glasius,
2018, p. 531).8 The rhetoric manifestations of these practices are speeches or official statements
5Hungary, often also mentioned in such lists, is omitted because according to most regime measures it no longer is
classified as a liberal democracy.
6"Many of our democratic worries about Donald Trump seem to arise from factors that do not bother us in the
comparative study of democracy: his unconstrained discourse, his violation of linguistic norms, and his programmatic
amorality." (Schedler, 2019, p. 434). And further: "[...] our perceptions of the threats Trump poses to US democracy do
not match our main theories of democratic instability" (Schedler, 2019, p. 435).
7As further examples for this nascent approach, Schedler (2019, p. 452) lists studies by Aalberg et al. (2017); Hawkins
and Kaltwasser (2017); McCoy et al. (2018).
8Regarding our use of the terms liberal and illiberal we emphasize that we do not refer here to any aspects of
the economic left-right but strictly limit ourselves to the narrow definition of political liberalism and illiberalism, as
conceptualized here. Hence, by liberal we do not mean economic (neo)liberalism, such as the ideology of free markets.

















Figure 1: Illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric (adjusted from Glasius, 2018, p. 531)
by the government and its agents which exceedingly emphasize nationalist, paternalist, and tra-
ditionalist values.9 One example for such an illiberal public rhetoric is Hungary’s Viktor Orbán.10
According to Orbán, the future of Hungary, Europe, and of Western civilization is endangered
by mass migration of Muslims, helped by sleep-walking European leaders under the influence
of some semi-hidden hands of world conspirators. We claim that it is unlikely to remain with-
out consequences for the functioning of democracy in a country, if its first representative publicly
speaks the way the Hungarian Prime Minister does - even more so, if he speaks like this over
several years, on virtually any occasion, and essentially every channel of communication.
The authoritarian category contains all practices that sabotage accountability11 and disable
access to information (Glasius, 2018, p. 531). The rhetoric manifestations of these practices are
official disinformation campaigns and other anti-pluralists communication strategies of regimes
to flood, manipulate, and control the public sphere of their countries. Such manipulations of how
citizens (can) talk and think about politics are typical phenomena to be observed in strictly au-
thoritarian regimes (Dukalskis, 2017). Yet, in the age of "fake news", official attempts of disabling
access to reliable information are increasingly observed also in Western liberal democracies.
One prominent, yet not the only (and most sophisticated) example of authoritarian language
practices in contemporary democracies is former US president Trump and his thousands of mis-
leading and false claims on a wide array of topics - as counted by major news outlets such as
The Washington Post (2020) or The Guardian (2020). During the Covid-19 pandemic, for in-
while pursuing neoliberal economic and social policies.
9As our empirical illustrations show, there is a qualitative difference between conservative values expressed in pub-
lic speeches (e.g. a more or less balanced reference to traditional values while also signalling tolerance for alternative
views) and, for example, an excessive emphasis of nationalism in illiberal public rhetoric.
10For some illustrations, we refer the reader to the Appendix.
11For various forms of accountability vital to democracy, see O’Donnell (2007b) or Lührmann et al. (2020).
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stance, Trump repeatedly downplayed the severity of the virus or spread disinformation about
testing and (unproven) treatments such as his idea of injecting antibacterial cleaning agents to
cure Covid-19 infections (Timm, 2020b,a; Paz, 2020).12 Beside this and other serious and irrespon-
sible disinformation on Covid-19 matters by Trump, his unsubstantiated allegations of electoral
fraud after Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential elections signaled yet another peak in his
falsehoods. As Kreuz and Windsor (2021) explain, throughout his presidency Trump stood out
with his unique speaking style - yet, it was particularly during the two weeks before the Capitol
riot in early January 2021 that his language style changed to more inflammatory rhetoric. His
public call to action to "[f]ight like hell, and if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a
country anymore" (cf. Blake, 2021) was followed by the storming of the Capitol by his supporters.
The examples of Orbán and Trump illustrate the difference between illiberal and authoritarian
public rhetoric and show why it makes sense to analytically distinguish between the two practices.
Illiberal practices are typically motivated by a more or less coherent nationalist and deeply con-
servative ideology. Authoritarian practices, in contrast, are characterized by arbitrary falsehoods.
Yet, as Figure 3 illustrates, the two categories also overlap. Orbán’s conspiracy beliefs on who
"really" runs the EU, for example, are similar to Trump’s false accounts. While Trump is known
for his contradictory statements on all kind of political and economic topics (Kruse and Weiland,
2016), he also disseminates highly nationalist views (Mudde, 2020). Political leaders might rely
on just one of the two language practices. Yet, if an overall nationalist, paternalist, and tradi-
tionalist language is combined with official disinformation campaigns and anti-pluralist rhetoric,
the population is substantially hindered from accessing reliable information and freely engaging
with public discourses. Hence, as Figure 3 shows, the intersection of illiberal and authoritarian
practices concerns violations of freedom of expression and attempts of disabling voice.
Liberal and democratic public rhetoric are the opposite poles to illiberal and authoritarian
public rhetoric. They, too, represent two different but heavily overlapping categories. Liberal
public rhetoric is characterized by an inclusive, egalitarian, and non-discriminatory language.
Democratic public rhetoric is reliable, fact-based, and emphasizes pluralist values.13
In sum, the everyday practices in political regimes also consist of public rhetoric by political
leaders. Such rhetoric comes in two distinct yet overlapping forms: libral-illiberal and democratic-
authoritarian. Capturing these elements of political regimes fills a gap in the regime change lit-
erature and has several advantages. First, overlooking rhetoric has been wrong all along. For
democracy, a reason-based and respectful dialogue of leaders, both with and in the public, is a
sine qua non (Habermas, 1984).14 Second, by analyzing public speeches as not yet institutionalized
practices of a political regime, changes in the regime do not have to be thought of as regime change
only, but can also be conceptualized and operationalized as more gradual regime transformations.
12For a detailed documentation of official disinformation campaigns during the Covid-19 pandemic see Edgell et al.
(2020a).
13While in this article we mainly conceptualize and empirically analyze how illiberal and authoritarian public
rhetoric relates to autocratization, future research might further explore the relationship between liberal and demo-
cratic public discourse and democratization.
14For empirical efforts to capture the quality of discourses, see Steenbergen et al. (2003).
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Radical and often quite dramatic and visible events are often just the endpoint of prior silent ero-
sion. Third, and related, public rhetoric should be established not as a direct indicator of, but as
a crucial proximate factor for political regimes and their transformations. Similar arguments have
been made about proximate causes being so proximate that they are considered essential parts of
the measurement strategies for gauging the likely development of political regimes. Consider the
role of coup attempt in the democratic consolidation literature. They are not a direct indicator of
failed democratic consolidation. It depends on the reaction to the coup attempt: do democratic
actors and institutions resist or succumb? If the latter, the coup attempt is an indicator of demo-
cratic breakdown; if the former, it is considered an indicator of the consolidation of democracy
(O’Donnell, 1996; Schedler, 2001). Public rhetoric plays a similar analytic role in our framework
for capturing present reality in political regimes and anticipating their likely development: do ac-
tors and institutions resist anti-democratic rhetoric or do they succumb? If the former, democracy
prevails, if the latter, it fails.15
4 Empirical illustrations
In the first part of this section, we empirically show how illiberal public rhetoric manifests itself
in official speeches of political leaders. Based on a dictionary application, we develop the Illib-
eral Speech Index (ISI). The second part of this section looks into the other language practice we
conceptualized above: authoritarian public rhetoric. We test with a regression analysis how au-
thoritarian public rhetoric - measured as official disinformation campaigns on social media and
anti-pluralist rhetoric of ruling parties - relates to the autocratization of regimes.
4.1 Illiberal public rhetoric: Nationalist, paternalist, and traditionalist speeches
We analyze the language of political leaders as the most crucial supporters, or underminers, of po-
litical institutions and the norms and values they enshrine. For measuring illiberal public rhetoric,
we zoom in on the public speeches of heads of government as the actors with most power to de-
fend, or undermine, a political regime. Especially in non-democratic settings, the impact of public
rhetoric by heads of government is exacerbated because access to the broader public is controlled
by them, making it more unlikely that citizens are exposed to rhetoric countering that of the gov-
ernment (Dukalskis, 2017). Such trends are also under way in those still-democracies that are
currently regressing towards more authoritarian forms of ruling.
To capture recurrent and persistent patterns in public rhetoric, we collect a large and hetero-
geneous pool of public speeches. The amount and diversity of speeches is crucial for our claim
that public discourses have an impact on political regimes. As Jaeger and Maier (cited in Wodak,
2009, p. 200) put it: "When analyzing power effects of discourse, it is important to distinguish
between the effects of a text and the effects of a discourse. A single text has minimal effects [...]. In
15The obvious difference between coups and public rhetoric is that the former are short and high-salience events
whereas the other stretches over long periods of time with no clear beginning or peak. This is why coups cause sudden
and corrosive public rhetoric more likely slow regime deaths.
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contrast, a discourse, with its recurring contents, symbols, and strategies, leads to the emergence
and solidification of ’knowledge’ and therefore has sustained effects."
Table 1 summarizes our corpus of speeches by displaying the speaker, country, status of the
regime, the number of speeches scraped, the dates of the first and the last speech in our data, and
the source from where the speeches were scraped. The corpus consists of 4 506 speeches from 25
heads of government of 22 countries during the period of 1999 to 2020. With our aim of investi-
gating the relationship between illiberal public rhetoric and democratic decline, we selected many
speeches from heads of government in political regimes that are experiencing autocratization (11
speakers in 9 regimes). Some of these regimes already transitioned into autocracy before or dur-
ing the time periods covered by our corpus and are further regressing, such as Serbia, Turkey,
Venezuela, and Hungary. Other regimes are declining democracies. Overall, we label the status
of these regimes "regressing". In order to calibrate our illiberal speech index, we include sev-
eral heads of government of clearly democratic (e.g. Sweden) and autocratic (e.g. North Korea)
regimes that do not experience an episode of autocratization.16
The speeches of each speaker in our corpus are of varying number and length. The major-
ity of them date back not more than a few years,17 enabling us to assess illiberal public rhetoric
during the most current crisis of democracy. The corpus consists of a mix of speeches for each
speaker in front of highly diverse audiences (national or international) and for different occasions.
This heterogeneity of the speeches is crucial for the validity of our dictionary analysis because it
helps to prevent context-specific bias (Maerz, 2019). We applied a broad understanding of political
speeches that includes political statements such as those typically done during (joint) press confer-
ences and interviews or other more spontaneously produced documents.18 Speeches are collected
from the official websites of the heads of government19 by using web-scraping techniques in R.
The majority of the speeches is in English language (occasionally report-like translations). The
speeches of Jair Bolsonaro and Recep Tayyip Erdogan were posted in a different language, which
is why we translated them with the help of machine translation tools.20 All texts with mixed con-
tents - e.g. comprising statements of other politicians - were filtered accordingly. We pre-processed
the speech corpus only minimally for the dictionary application (letters converted to lower case,
punctuation removed, and misleading collocations erased).21
16Our regime classifications and the operationalization of autocratization are based on the Episodes of Regime Trans-
formation (ERT) dataset of Edgell et al. (2020b), as also further explained in Section 4.2.
17The official usage of the Internet by political regimes to legitimize their rule is only a recent trend, cf. Maerz (2016).
18The material of the Polish prime ministers Beata Szydlo and Mateusz Morawiecki consists of comparatively short
direct quotations which are regularly published in the news section of the government’s official websites.
19One exception is the collection of speeches given by Donald Trump which we scraped from factba.se.
20de Vries et al. (2018) show that for bag-of-words text mining approaches the outcome of machine-translated and
human-translated texts highly overlap.
21All analyses were done in R; replication files are available upon request.
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Speaker Country Status Speeches First Last Source
Angela Merkel Germany Democracy 69 2014-02 2020-07 bundesregierung.de
Erna Solberg Norway Democracy 243 2013-11 2020-10 regjeringen.no
Jacinda Ardern New Zealand Democracy 66 2017-11 2020-07 beehive.govt.nz
Justin Trudeau Canada Democracy 151 2015-12 2020-10 pm.gc.ca
Leo Varadkar Ireland Democracy 216 2017-06 2020-06 gov.ie
Stefan Löfven Sweden Democracy 79 2014-10 2020-10 government.se
Alexander Vučić Serbia Regressing 18 2019-07 2020-10 predsednik.rs
Andrej Babis Czech Republic Regressing 30 2018-01 2020-09 vlada.cz
Andrzej Duda Poland Regressing 18 2015-11 2019-11 prezydent.pl/
Beata Szydlo Poland Regressing 24 2015-11 2017-09 premier.gov.pl
Donald Trump USA Regressing 286 2017-02 2020-09 factba.se
Jair Bolsonaroa Brazil Regressing 291 2019-01 2020-10 gov.br
Mateusz Morawiecki Poland Regressing 39 2017-12 2020-08 premier.gov.pl
Narendra Modi India Regressing 83 2014-11 2020-10 pmindia.gov.in
Nicolas Maduro Moros Venezuela Regressing 8 2015-07 2020-09 pmppre.gob.ve
Recep Tayyip Erdogana Turkey Regressing 745 2014-08 2020-10 tccb.gov.tr
Viktor Orbán Hungary Regressing 598 2014-06 2020-10 kormany.hu
Dmitry Medvedev Russia Autocracy 131 2008-05 2012-04 kremlin.ru
Emomali Rahmon Tajikistan Autocracy 102 2004-09 2020-09 president.tj
Ilham Aliyev Azerbaijan Autocracy 613 2010-04 2020-09 president.az
Kim Jong Unb North Korea Autocracy 24 2012-04 2016-09 naenara.com.kp
M.b.R. Al Maktoum UAE Autocracy 94 1999-04 2019-12 sheikhmohammed.ae
Paul Biya Cameroon Autocracy 56 2013-01 2020-01 prc.cm
Vladimir Putinc Russia Autocracy 433 2000-01 2020-09 kremlin.ru
Yoweri Museveni Uganda Autocracy 89 2011-05 2020-10 statehouse.go.ug
Overall corpus: 4506
a The speeches of Jair Bolsonaro and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are machine translated using the Google translation API.
b The material of North Korea consists of official letters rather than speeches.
c The speeches cover Putin’s four presidential terms.
Table 1: Overview of speakers and speech corpus
The core of our argument consists in the claim that speeches can be ranked on a scale of lib-
eralism. The speech index that we propose has as its endpoints in purely illiberal and liberal
speeches. We use a dictionary approach to classify each speech and, based on that, each speaker
of these speeches on our Illiberal Speech Index (ISI) on public rhetoric. The dictionary approach
requires a collection of liberal and illiberal terms. Those terms are provided by researchers. Each
speech is attributed a value on the speech index based on the relative frequency with which liberal
and illiberal terms from the dictionary occur in it. If liberal and illiberal terms are in a balance,
the speech receives a score of 0 on our scale. If liberal terms predominate, the score turns positive
and approaches the purely liberal speech. If illiberal terms occur more frequently, the index score
turns negative, approaching the ideal-typical illiberal speech.
Our dictionary for the analysis is adopted from Maerz and Schneider (2019).22 The dictionary
includes 129 terms that are clearly associated with either liberal or illiberal public rhetoric, as con-
ceptualized above. Examples of dictionary terms that measure liberal public rhetoric are free-,
liberal-, tolera- and words such as discriminat-, authoritarian-, and repressi-, typically used to
insist on more civil and political rights. In contrast to this, illiberalism is measured with key
words such as anarch-, chaos, destabili-, or patriot- and pride. Maerz and Schneider (2019) com-
22See the Appendix for the list of dictionary terms. We slightly adjusted the dictionary and deleted six terms which
we identified as ambiguous in a qualitative key-words-in-context check in parts of our corpus. While the dictionary
was comprehensively validated by Maerz and Schneider (2019), we deem such additional qualitative checks and re-
validation as crucial every time dictionaries are re-used for other corpuses of texts (Maerz and Puschmann, 2020).
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prehensively test the validity of the dictionary with qualitative hand-coding, unsupervised topic
modeling, network analysis, and by illustrating its criterion validity. To illustrate the relative pro-
portional difference between the speakers in the analysis, we make use of Lowe et al. (2011)’s spatial
model of logit scaling. For a more detailed and technical description of the statistical procedure
for creating the index, see Maerz and Schneider (2019).
Figure 2 displays the Illiberal Speech Index (ISI) for the cases listed in Table 1 as the result of
our dictionary analysis. From top to bottom, speakers are ranked from highest (most liberal) to
lowest (most illiberal) scores on our speech index. The markers indicate the average score across
each speaker’s speeches, with 95 percent confidence intervals expressing the uncertainty attached
to each point estimate. The vertical line at index value 0 separates liberal (right) from illiberal
(left) speakers. The marker color separates speakers in democratic (green), regressing (purple),




















































Illiberal Speech Index (ISI)
Regime Types: ● ● ●Autocracy Regressing Democracy
The lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2: The Illiberal Speech Index (ISI): Scaling the ideological content of all speeches per speaker
As Figure 2 shows, all heads of government from democratic, non-regressing regimes score as
clearly liberal speakers on our index. In contrast to this, the speakers of stable autocratic regimes
are at the (far) illiberal end of the scale. Together, these classifications are in line with what one
would expect based on common sense and case expertise, fostering the face validity of our in-
dex. While three leaders of regressing regimes (Beata Szydlo, Mateusz Morawiecki, and Narenda
Modi) cannot be classified on our scale with statistical certainty,23 all other regressing regimes are
23Their point estimates as well as the point estimate of Uganda’s Museveni have a confidence interval that crosses
the 0 value of our scale, that is, statistically the content of their speeches cannot be unequivocally classified as liberal or
illiberal.
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ruled by illiberal speakers. For some of the illiberal speakers in regressing regimes we were able
to collect higher numbers of speeches (e.g. Jair Bolsonaro, Viktor Orbán, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
Donald Trump, cf. Table 1) which is why their confidence interval is comparatively small, lending
further reliability to their positions on the illiberal side of the scale.
The data shown in Figure 2 show that for the cases included in our analysis there is a stark
qualitative difference between the liberal public rhetoric used in functioning democracies such as
Sweden, Norway, or Germany, on the one hand, and the illiberal language of heads of govern-
ment in declining regimes such as Turkey under Erdogan or Hungary under Orbán. Figure 2 also
reveals that for several regressing democracies, for instance the US under Trump or Brazil un-
der Bolsonaro, their illiberal public rhetoric shows remarkable similarities to that in fully-fledged
autocracies like Azerbaijan or Russia.
To further illustrate the capability of the Illiberal Speech Index to signal ongoing regime trans-
formation processes already before it comes to a breakdown of democracy, we compare our index
to some of V-Dem’s "early warning" indicators of autocratization (Maerz et al., 2020b; Coppedge
et al., 2020a) . We use V-Dem here since other political regime measures, such as Polity or Free-
dom House, are highly aggregated constructs. This makes their indices notoriously insensitive
for analytically relevant gradual transformations that occur under the hood and only in some as-
pects that matter for the overall assessment of the nature and future of a political regime. This
is often problematic, and in particular so in the context of our research. We do not expect that
public rhetoric alone and in a matter of only a few years will change the institutional make-up of
a political regime tout court. It is much more plausible to expect the effect of illiberal speech in
a democracy to have corrosive effects on only parts of what makes up the essence of democracy,
as several of V-Dem’s disaggregated subindicators show. Those effects on sub-components of a
regime might add up over time and eventually lead to changes big enough to be also registered
by Freedom House or Polity scores.
As Maerz et al. (2020b) illustrate, harbingers of democratic decline are not, as one might expect,
the decay of electoral institutions. Instead, democracy starts dying via declines in freedom of the
media, civil liberties, freedom of academic and cultural expression, and other liberal principles.
Our expectation therefore is: formally democratic regimes in which heads of government speak
with an illiberal tongue are also those regimes in which V-Dem’s early warning indicators foresee
democratic decline.24
Figure 3 ("Government Censorship Effort") and Figure 4 ("Freedom of Academic and Cultural
Expression") show precisely this: the speakers we identify as clearly illiberal on our scale (left
of the vertical line) are all leaders of regimes that experienced dramatic drops in terms of media
freedom and other liberties during the last decade. This is shown by the purple-colored cases and
their long grey dashed lines leading South, with Turkey being the case declining most on both of
V-Dem’s early warning indicators. In contrast, among democracies (green markers) with liberal
24For illustrative purposes, we chose the ordinal versions of all V-Dem variables used. The section on cross-validation
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Regime Types: ● ● ●Autocracy Regressing Democracy
The vertical dashed lines signify the change of the Government Censorship score in 2019
       compared to 2009. The horizontal colored lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the ISI, 
       the vertical colored lines the Bayesian 68% highest posterior density intervals of the Government Censorship score.
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Regime Types: ● ● ●Autocracy Regressing Democracy
The vertical dashed lines signify the change of the Freedom of Academic and Cult. Expression score in 2019
       compared to 2009. The horizontal colored lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the ISI, 
       the vertical colored lines the Bayesian 68% highest posterior density intervals of the 
       Freedom of Academic and Cult. Expression score.
Figure 4: Freedom of Academic and Cult. Expression and the Illiberal Speech Index (ISI)
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speakers (right of the vertical line), no decay in liberal institutions is detectable. By identifying
the liberal rather than the electoral component as the weak spot of democracy, these comparative
illustrations further validate our Illiberal Speech Index and also provide additional support for
our basic assumption that what matters most when analyzing the current crisis of democracy is a
focus on its liberal essence.
4.2 Authoritarian public rhetoric: Government disinformation and anti-pluralism
Following Glasius (2018) and our conceptualization above, we stipulate that there are two ana-
lytically distinct yet overlapping dimensions of public rhetoric that are relevant as early warning
signs for democratic decay: illiberal and authoritarian rhetoric. The former, we have just analyzed
using a machine-based approach to texts. Measuring authoritarian public rhetoric across countries
is a methodologically challenging matter, though. Identifying official government disinformation
campaigns and anti-pluralist speeches in multiple cases is more difficult than the detection of an
illiberal discourse in the form of nationalist, paternalist, and traditionalist language style. Unfor-
tunately, the dictionary analysis we have used for this is too coarse and not suitable for tracking
deceitful lies, "fake news", or a subliminal advertising of anti-pluralist values in official speeches.
Novel deep learning techniques to automatically detect disinformation are still limited in terms
of their real-world implementation (Islam et al., 2020). We therefore rely on human-coded data of
authoritarian public rhetoric and apply logistic regression analysis25 in order to assess the impact
of authoritarian public discourse on the autocratization of political regimes.
Our dependent variable in the logistic regression is a binary variable that indicates whether a
country is experiencing autocratization (1) or not (0). For the operationalization of Autocratization,
we rely on the new Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset (Edgell et al., 2020b; Maerz
et al., 2020a). The ERT detects episodes of autocratization based on a sustained and substantial
decline of V-Dem’s expert-coded Electoral Democracy Index (EDI).26 The EDI assesses the degree
to which a political regime respects the principles of polyarchy by Dahl (1971). It is based on over
forty indicators - including several measurements on liberal components of democracy, such as
media freedom and civil liberties.
Our main independent variable - authoritarian public rhetoric - is operationalized with two
indicators: government disinformation on social media (Disinformation) and Anti-pluralist rhetoric
of ruling parties. For the operationalization of government disinformation on social media we
rely on V-Dem’s indicator v2smgovdom of the Digital Society Survey (Mechkova et al., 2019). It
assesses the extent to which a government or its agents use social media to disseminate misleading
viewpoints or false information to influence its own population. For measuring anti-pluralist
rhetoric of ruling parties we use the novel V-Party index on Anti-pluralism (Lührmann et al., 2020).
It captures the extent to which ruling parties are committing to non-democratic norms already
25Due to its varying coverage, the Illiberal Speech Index is (not yet) available as country-year measures and therefore
not included in this regression analysis.
26Sustained and substantial means, for example, a decline of more than 10 percent of the index value over the dura-
tion of the episode. For further details on the ERT parameters see Edgell et al. (2020b).
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before coming to power. While these expert-coded indicators on government disinformation and
party rhetoric can merely serve as proxies of actual analyses of public speeches as we have done
above, they are still useful pointers to how authoritarian public rhetoric covaries with regime
autocratization.
As control variables we include several aspects identified in the literature as crucial factors of
autocratization (e.g. Boese et al., 2020). Military coups can be serious threats to democracy (Mari-
nov and Goemans, 2014). We control for the occurrence of one or several coups per country and
year as a binary Coup variable based on two coup datasets included in V-Dem (e_pt_coups and e_-
coups). Following the theory of Linz (1990) on the perils of presidentialism due to less constraints
on the executive and by making use of V-Dem’s fine-graded data, we further control for Judicial
constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon) and Legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon) as
expected safeguards against autocratization. In addition, we account for diffusion effects (e.g.
Brinks and Coppedge, 2006) by including a measurement on average Regional democracy levels,
constructed with the help of V-Dem’s EDI. We also control for economic factors by including a
variable on GDP growth from the Maddison Project (Bold and Luiten van Zanden, 2020). Apart
from that, the analysis contains a time index (Timetrend) to control for time trends which might
affect autocratization and a variable on Internet use (ITU, 2020). The latter is included as an inter-
acting variable with Disinformation since we expect that with increasing Internet use the effects of
social media disinformation by regimes might also change.
Based on this data, the analysis covers 1 365 cases of country years from 2001 to 2019. With
our main interest in analyzing how authoritarian public rhetoric relates to democratic decline, the
analysis includes only democracies and regressing democracies, but not autocracies. All inde-
pendent and control variables except for Anti-pluralist rhetoric,27 Coup, and Timetrend are lagged
by one year. Due to the binary nature of our dependent variable, we use the R package bife to
estimate a logistic model with country-fixed effects.28 As illustrated in the robustness checks in
the Appendix, we cross-checked the outcome of the bife model with a generalized linear model
(glm) - showing the same results - transformed some of the variables due to skewed distributions
(Disinformation, Regional democracy levels, and Internet have been logged) and made use of bife’s
post-estimation routine to substantially reduce the incidental parameter bias problem present in
non-linear fixed-effects models (Stammann et al., 2020). We also run alternative models based on
all political regimes and all but closed autocracies.29 The Appendix includes all regression tables
and further diagnostics, such as heat map (Esarey et al., 2016) and separation plot (Greenhill et al.,
2011) to specifically assess the robustness of binary-dependent variable models.30
27The V-Party dataset assesses party identities before elections; we filled the variable for the entire election cycle of a
ruling party.
28We include the Timetrend variable instead of year-fixed effects to not overly restrict the model.
29The main difference of these alternative models compared to our main model on autocratization in democracies
only is that Disinformation is not showing as statistically significant variable, which could be due to the highly frequent
use of disinformation in autocracies - independent of regressing or not.
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Figure 5: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regression with country-
fixed effects predicting autocratization (regression table with full details in Appendix).
Figure 5 summarizes the results of the analysis by illustrating the coefficient estimates and
95% confidence intervals of our binary logistic regression model with country-fixed effects. The
coefficients for our two main independent variables - Disinformation and Anti-pluralist rhetoric -
are positively related to autocratization on a statistically significant level. As the regression table
(Table 3) in the Appendix shows, this is true for both a bivariate and multivariate model with
p < 0.01. Overall, these findings are in support of our argument that authoritarian public rhetoric
is an important factor of autocratization.
Apart from the two independent variables, Figure 5 shows that the occurrence of coups is
also positively related to autocratization. Legislative constraints on the executive is negatively re-
lated to autocratization, indicating that if fully-functioning, such constraints can indeed be one
potential safeguard from autocratization. While the other control variables do not show up as sta-
tistically significant coefficients in our model, the Timetrend variable is slightly positively related
to autocratization, suggesting that during the time period observed (2001-2019), autocratization
has accelerated. Lastly, the interaction between Disinformation and Internet is - on a comparatively
small level - negatively related to autocratization. This finding confirms our expectation that with
increasing Internet use among the population, the effects of official disinformation campaigns on
social media might change: as Internet diffusion increases, the effect of government disinforma-
tion via social media on autocratization weakens. The population can refer to alternative online
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Regime Types: ● ● ●Autocracy Regressing Democracy
The vertical dashed lines signify the change of the Government Disinformation on Social Media score in 2019
       compared to 2009. The horizontal colored lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the ISI, 
       the vertical colored lines the Bayesian 68% highest posterior density intervals of the 
       Government Disinformation on Social Media score.




















Alexander Vucic − Serbia is Wi...
Andrej Babis − ANO
Andrzej Duda − PiS
Angela Merkel − CDU
Donald Trump − Rep
Emomali Rahmon − PDPT
Erna Solberg − H
Ilham Aliyev − YAP
Jacinda Ardern − LP
Jair Bolsonaro − PSL
Justin Trudeau − LP
Kim Jong Un − DFRF
Leo Varadkar − FG
Narendra Modi − BJP
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Stefan Löfven − S
Viktor Orbán − Fidesz
Vladimir Putin − ER
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Regime Types: ● ● ●Autocracy Regressing Democracy
The vertical grey dashed lines signify the change of the last Anti−pluralist rhetoric score compared to the first score covered by the speech corpus.
       The horizontal colored lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the ISI, 
       the vertical colored lines the Bayesian 68% highest posterior density intervals of the Anti−pluralist rhetoric index.
Figure 7: Anti-pluralist rhetoric and the Illiberal Speech Index (ISI)
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5 The relationship between illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric
We conceptualized illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric as two different but strongly over-
lapping and mutually not exclusive categories. How does that unfold empirically? In Figure 6 and
Figure 7, we illustrate the relationship between authoritarian public rhetoric - measured based on
the two variables government disinformation on social media (Disinformation) and Anti-pluralist
rhetoric of ruling parties - and the Illiberal Speech Index, in both plots displayed on the x-axis.
The y-axis of Figure 6 shows the extent to which a government spreads disinformation on social
media on a flipped Likert scale from 0 (extremely often) to 4 (never).31 The horizontal colored
lines and point estimates are the variable scores and confidence intervals for 2019. The vertical
grey dashed lines show how much these scores changed compared to 2009. The y-axis of Figure 7
shows the extent to which ruling parties make use of anti-pluralist rhetoric (interval, from low to
high, 0-1). Since this V-Party index (Lührmann et al., 2020) is based on election cycles instead of
country years, the horizontal colored lines and point estimates are here the scores and confidence
intervals of the last year covered by our speech corpus. The vertical grey dashed lines signify the
change of the last compared to the first score covered by the speech corpus.
Figure 6 illustrates that for most cases covered in our analyses, autocratization comes along
with both an illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric: all case markers in violet are left of the
vertical line and below the Disinformation score of 3. While several of the regressing regimes,
such as Brazil, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and the US did not exhibit any meaningful
extent of official disinformation in 2009, their levels substantially dropped during the last decade.
Regarding the US under Trump or Bolsonaro’s Brazil, this trend has further exacerbated in 2020
as Edgell et al. (2020a) show with their data on pandemic backsliding and official disinformation
campaigns during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Figure 7 points even more explicitly to the strong connection between illiberal and authori-
tarian public rhetoric: nearly all heads of government in regressing regimes that score as illiberal
speakers on the ISI,32 also score as parties with high levels of anti-pluralist rhetoric.33 Further-
more, some cases, such as Hungary’s Fidesz or Poland’s PiS and the Republicans under Trump,
show a remarkable downtrend during the time covered by our speech corpus. In sum, both fig-
ures further strengthen the face validity of the ISI index and also cross-validate our measures of
illiberal and authoritarian public rhetoric in general since stable democracies typically score high
and autocracies low on both dimensions. The figures also illustrate that illiberal and authoritarian
public rhetoric seem to be two sides of the same coin: worrisome language practices that harm
democracy.
31For illustrative purposes and in contrast to the regression analysis, we use the ordinal version of the V-Dem variable
v2smgovdom here.
32India’s confidence interval is crossing the zero point.
33While Czech Republic’s ruling party, the ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), scores high on V-Party’s Populism
index, it is not classified as particularly non-pluralist by the dataset (Lührmann et al., 2020).
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6 Conclusion
This paper has focused on the rhetoric of political leaders and its role in regime transformation.
Long being ignored as a crucial aspect of the survival prospects of liberal democracies, public dis-
course is slowly finding its way (back) into the analysis of political regimes - a development trig-
gered by the emergence of both modern text-as-data techniques and blatantly obvious examples
of democratic decline via a deteriorating public rhetoric of core political figures. Distinguishing
two forms of anti-democratic discourses - illiberal and authoritarian - we have have shown that
both of them are closely linked to democratic decline. In other words, it does not remain without
consequences for the political regime as a whole if its main representatives signal via their rhetoric
that they have abandoned the core values of that regime.
We see several avenues for further research. One such avenue could treat our speech index
as the independent variable for a whole set of phenomena of interest. For instance, does lasting
illiberal rhetoric by the head of government in liberal democracies lead to an erosion of citizens’
support for liberal values? Or, does such rhetoric affect the level of trust in liberal institutions
among citizens? Another avenue forward could treat our speech index as the dependent variable
and investigate the causes of why such rhetoric is adopted in some countries and not others. Is this
driven by latent normative commitments among citizens? Or, is it triggered by major economic
and social crises? A third, related, road ahead could be to unpack the causal mechanism that
links anti-democratic rhetoric to democratic decline. Does illiberal discourse shift the realm of
the thinkable (and sayable) first among political elites and then among citizens, vice versa, or
simultaneously? Is anti-democratic discourse closely tied to the speaker or does it outlast a change
in leadership? How do the frequency and duration of anti-democratic discourse influence its
effect on citizens’ perceptions? These and similar questions are crucial for those whose goal it is
to counter-act the consequences of illiberal and authoritarian discourse.
One key aspect of future research on public rhetoric and regime change ought to be the role
of the (new) media. The more heterogeneous the messaging and information is to which citi-
zens are exposed, the lower the impact of government-led discourses should be. Inversely, the
more governments in backsliding democracies manage to get the media under their control, the
more impact their illiberal and authoritarian discourse will have on the survival rate of liberal
democracy. If true, this does not bode well for the prospect of democracy in backsliding regimes,
for backsliding consists precisely of the step-wise breakdown of democratic institutions and each
such step tends to make the next step down the ladder toward autocracy more likely and easier to
achieve.
All possible future avenues will benefit from more data. Extending our corpus of speeches both
in time and space is definitely one of the next steps. Fortunately, such an extension of this already
massive data set comes at relatively low costs. Once more extensive use is made of machine-
based translations into English of the original speech texts, no insurmountable obstacle exists
to harvesting speeches of all heads of government around the globe who make their speeches
available in electronic form, which an overwhelming majority does.
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Appendix
Quotes by Viktor Orbán
“[...] The truth is that Europe is being threatened by mass migration on an unprece-
dented scale. Tens of millions of people could come to Europe. Today we are talking
about hundreds of thousands, but next year we will be talking about millions, and this
will never end. There is unlimited supply for this mass migration, because only some
of those who are coming are actually from war zones. [...] And one morning we could
wake up and realise that we are in the minority on our own continent. [...] they (the
migrants) could occupy Hungary – something not unprecedented in our history – or
they could introduce communism."34
“ Why does the Hungarian government support the fence? It supports the fence
because it works. It works! [...] A winter break. I beseech you not to fall for illusions:
there will be no winter break. There will be no winter break in refugee affairs, illegal
migration and the global crisis. [...] We may expect quite the opposite: rather than
a break, [...] we should prepare for an increased flood and mass of people. The real
problem is that there are some in Europe – I do not know if they are in the majority, but
it is certain that leaders who say things like this are in the majority, which is of course
not the same as the people – who believe that what is happening is a good thing, and
that this is a great opportunity for their countries to change. [...] They are not worried
by the experience that we – the European Christian cultural community – have so
far been unable to integrate them (Muslim communities), and that therefore parallel
societies are coming into being in a number of European countries, with declining
Christian and increasing Muslim ratios."35
“[...] I could also say that they (in Brussels) have opened the door to George Soros’s
plan, and in the period ahead I expect to see the acceleration of that plan’s implemen-
tation. [...] So we’re not an immigrant country, and Hungary doesn’t want to become
an immigrant country; at least I as Prime Minister have been authorised by the Hun-
garian people to protect this country’s economic, cultural and spiritual identity, its
traditions and interests. [...] I will never allow any great power – any top dog, any
former colonial power or their Brussels supporters beholden to them – to turn us into
an immigrant country. [...] Therefore we must ensure that they withdraw this decision
on the mandatory quota system: they must change it, and we must prevent this one-
off decision being turned into a permanent migrant distribution mechanism. In other
words we must foil the plan of George Soros’s people in Brussels. Now there will be a
political struggle, which may take a number of forms and in which we shall fight with
all our strength."36
34Interview with Viktor Orbán on September 4, 2015: https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-
prime-minister-s-speeches/if-we-do-not-protect-our-borders-tens-of-millions-of-migrants-will-come
35Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s reply in Parliament on September 25, 2015: https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-
prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-reply-in-parliament
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Regime Types: ● ● ●Autocracy Regressing Democracy
The vertical dashed lines signify the change of the Media Bias score in 2019
       compared to 2009. The horizontal colored lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the ISI, 
       the vertical colored lines the Bayesian 68% highest posterior density intervals of the Media Bias score.
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Regime Types: ● ● ●Autocracy Regressing Democracy
The vertical dashed lines signify the change of the CSO Repression score in 2019
       compared to 2009. The horizontal colored lines represent the 95% confidence intervals of the ISI, 
       the vertical colored lines the Bayesian 68% highest posterior density intervals of the CSO Repression score.
Figure 9: CSO Repression and the Illiberal Speech Index (ISI)
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Regression analysis, robustness checks
glm bife1 bife2a bife3b
Disinformation 24.07 24.07 9.08 7.23
Anti-pluralist rhetoric 7.87 7.87 7.10 5.19
Coup 2.56 2.56 4.20 3.39
Judicial constraints on executive 10.91 10.91 2.91 2.15
Legislative constraints on executive -11.88 -11.88 -7.45 -6.43
Regional democracy levels -17.25 -17.25 -4.04 -3.39
GDP growth -5.37 -5.37 -4.23 -3.38
Timetrend 0.49 0.49 1.20 0.98
Disinformation∗Internet -0.59 -0.59 -2.51 -2.03
a Transformed variables (logged Disinformation, Internet, Regional democracy levels).
b Transformed variables (logged Disinformation, Internet, Regional democracy levels) and corrected.
Table 2: Comparing coefficients of Model 2 with glm and bife
Autocratization (in democracies)
Model 1 Model 2
log(Disinformation) 2.54∗∗∗ 7.23∗∗
(0.62) (2.23)




Judicial constraints on executive 2.15
(5.17)
Legislative constraints on executive −6.43∗
(2.94)








Log Likelihood −194.47 −101.14
Deviance 388.94 202.28
Num. obs. 408 408
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Table 3: Model outcomes for autocratization in democracies (main models)
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Autocratization (all regimes)
Model 1 Model 2
log(Disinformation) 1.45∗∗∗ −0.59
(0.43) (0.73)




Judicial constraints on executive 3.31∗
(1.67)
Legislative constraints on executive −2.73∗
(1.32)








Log Likelihood −374.53 −308.41
Deviance 749.06 616.82
Num. obs. 719 719
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Table 4: Model outcomes for autocratization in all regimes
Autocratization (all but closed regimes)
Model 1 Model 2
log(Disinformation) 1.44∗∗∗ 0.27
(0.44) (0.81)




Judicial constraints on executive 4.28∗
(1.85)
Legislative constraints on executive −5.42∗∗
(1.78)








Log Likelihood −357.05 −288.70
Deviance 714.11 577.40
Num. obs. 683 683
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Table 5: Model outcomes for all but closed regimes
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Plots on model fit







































Predicted Probability Deviation 
 Model Predictions vs. Empirical Frequency
Figure 10: Heat map plot to evaluate the fit of our main binary model, cf. Esarey et al., (2016).
Figure 11: Separation plot to evaluate the fit of our main binary model, cf. Greenhill et al. (2011).
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